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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes exibility in working hours from a theoretical point of view. The aim of this analysis is
not only how much work is performed, but also when it is performed. In this context exibility is understood as
the capacity to match the preferences of workers well to the rms needs. We draw up a model for determining
the schedules in an economy with heterogeneous agents. Types are distinguished by their preferences for
leisure time or production time. First we dene the economy without exibility. Then we analyze, under
exibility, what the optimal working schedule would be for each worker type. This is conditioned by the
capital used in the plant. The baseline model solves the assignment of di¤erent types of workers to di¤erent
production plants in a competitive equilibrium. The model enables us to determine what capital stock the
plants must have and during what period they should be used in order that they adjust to the preferences.
The exible results, that conform to the preferences of rms and workers, it is optimal, e¢ cient and reaches
the maximum instantaneous aggregate production of the economy.
As an extension of the model we analyze the possibility of working at home. In this case the capital stock
does not condition the work schedule. Thus, not only the time of work, but also the workplace turn into
endogenous variables.
Keywords: exibility, heterogeneity, work at home, production plant, work schedule.
JEL Codes: E22, J21, J22.
1 Introduction
Flexibility in the labor market is considered as part of a more far-reaching change in working arrangements,
designed to increase the capacity of rms to innovate and to adapt to changes in product markets and in the
demands brought about by new life styles. In addition, in the recessive phase of the cycle the need for more
exibility on the labor market is often argued as a premise to be able to confront economic recovery in some
advanced economies. Nevertheless, the concept of exibility, particularly on the labor market, is complex and
includes several facets and instruments to put it into practice. Our interest in exibility focuses on the time
of work especially, not so much how long a worker is employed but when he/she works. Flexibility, in the
sense of when and how long the employees are working, is better for rms and workers than exibility in the
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sense of the number of employees. As one will see along this article the time in which we work is important
enough to be studied from the standpoint of economic analysis.
In this paper we focus on the exibility of working hours, a exibility practice that has already been
implemented in many companies1 , but this has not been su¢ ciently analyzed from the point of view of eco-
nomic analysis. We adopt the meaning of the term exibility used in studies about work-life time balance as
in Tausing and Fenwisk (2001): exibility implies that workers have some control or choice over their work
schedules. We draw up a tractable general equilibrium model that determines work schedules as an equilib-
rium outcome between the rms decision and workerspreferences. In doing so, we assume heterogeneity in
worker preferences and in production plants to encourage exibility. Workers are heterogeneous in relation
to their leisure (or non-market time) preferences. Firms organize their production in plants with di¤erent
working hours. Each individual type is classied by the time of day around which they prefer to organize their
workday, and this is consistently the time of day in which leisure is less valued by workers. As regards rms,
we also assume that there is a time of maximum production for a given unit of time. This paper analyzes
the optimal determination of work schedules in the presence of such heterogeneity. Workers and rms take
their decisions about when to work on the basis of the available alternatives. When the worker is employed
on his/her optimal workday (lowest disutility) his/her salary will be less than if he/she is employed in a
workday with more disutility for him/her. Consequently, on the optimal workday the employee will demand
a wage on the basis of his/her lowest reservation wage. On the other hand, higher productivity during a
workday enables the rm to pay higher wages to the employees. We look into the circumstances under which
exibility leads to an e¢ cient assignment.
In 2004, about 30% of full-time wage workers had exible schedules in the United States, which is more
than double that in 19852 . In the European Union, social policy demands that social partners negotiate
the modernization of working time to generate positive exibility, that is, the synchronization of employer
and employee time needs, contributing to sustainable work-life balance policies for employees as well as high
performance for workplaces (Morris and Pillinger, 2008). According to the EU Labour Force Survey (ad-hoc
module about work organization and working time arrangements) in 2004, 64.6% of employees report a xed
start and end of a working day". The rest of employees had some form of variable working hours3 . From
the Fourth European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) (2007), around 40% of the European workers do
not have xed starting and nishing working hours, and around 50% do not work the same number of hours
every day. Bettio et al (1998) conrm that work arrangements with exible working time such as part-time
work, telecommuting, compressed workweeks, annualized hours contracts, and time banks have increased
substantially since 1990 in advanced industrial economies. Specically, some forms of exible schedule are:
Flexitime: workday start and end times di¤er from the workgroups standard, although the same number
of hours per day is usually maintained. Compressed Workweeks: full-time options that enable employees to
work longer days for part of a week or pay period in exchange for shorter days or a day o¤. Other practices
are part-time: working fewer than 35 hours per week, and job sharing: full-time position shared by two
people, each working part-time. Beside know how many workers enjoy exibility, it is important to know if it
is because they wish it or becasuse the company imposes it. In this sense, following the EWCS, in northern
european countries, around half of employees declare they can choose to adapt working time to their needs
to a large extent. This is in sharp contrast to southern and eastern European countries, where more than
75% of employees have no possibility of adapting their work schedules, as they are set by the company.
As an extension of the model we analyze the possibility of working at home, that we consider the way to
achieve the maxima exibility. It does not treat itself of household production that is nonmarket activity.
We introduce the paid work at home that is characterized by a few limited requirements of capital, more the
availability and utilization of the technologies of the information and communication, which they allow to
work from any place and at any time of day or week. From the EWCS, 12% of European workers report
working at least a quarter of the time from home without a PC, and 8% at home with a PC. This suggest
that telework or working from home is used by a substantial proportion of people as a complement to their
1Some examples of successful workplace exibility implementation can be found in Intel, JPMorgan Chase, IBM. See
http://www.worldatwork.org.
2Data from Current Population Survey, Supplement, May 2004.
3 In the LFS module variable working hours are classied into the following categories: Staggered working hours, banded
start and end; working time banking with possibility only of taking hours o¤; working time banking with possibility of taking
full days o¤ (as well as taking hours o¤); start and end of working day varying by individual agreement; each determines their
own work schedule (no formal boundaries).
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normal working arrangements. Respect to the relationship between the place of work and working hours,
those working at company premises show much less variation in their weekly working hours than all the
others. Working from home is by nature much more exible time-wise.
It is di¢ cult to nd evidence about schedules in and out of work. We observe statistics of weekly working
hours that focus on how many people work full-time or part-time, or how many people work less than 35
hours a week or more than 50 hours. There is also no evidence about the time of day that workers prefer to
be employed, only about the number of hours. From the time use statistics we know what percentage of the
population are working every hour of the day. In Figure 1 we show data on three countries conrming that
the work activity is concentrated between 8 am and 6 pm.
Fagan (2005) presents evidence about the number of hours that men and women would prefer to work,
and their assessments of the degree of compatibility between their work schedules and their family and other
commitments, drawn from the European Working Conditions Survey 2000. It is noted that preferences adapt
when changes in economic conditions, workplace innovations or policy interventions alter the context, and
people make decisions based on the alternatives that they consider to be open to them4 . Working-time
preferences are rarely fully carried out in practice because of the constraints imposed by the job, the rm
or the market. To analyze the compatibility between work schedules and family life, the survey classi¢ es
workers according to their di¤erent types of day and asks if their working hours t in with their family or
social commitments outside work very well, fairly well or not at all well5 . Workers said that daytime, weekday
work without long days is the most compatible. Variable start and nish times are less compatible than xed
ones, particularly when the variation is set by the employer, but also when the workers have some inuence
in varying their hours. In this latter case, the problem is that this autonomy may be associated with jobs
that require a commitment of long hours.
Our motivation lies not only on the importance for society to reconciling work with personal life, but also
on their e¤ects on employment and output. If the working hours are tailored to the preferences, the activity
rate of the labor force will be higher, and this could increase the usage time of equipment and increase output.
More specically, with exible work schedules, employees experience several benets, some of which could be:
external childcare costs may decrease; reduced burnout; increased feeling of personal control over schedule;
avoiding commuting during rush hours; greater exibility to meet family needs and life responsibilities and
allowing people to work when they accomplish most, feel most refreshed and enjoy working (e.g.morning
person versus night person). With regard to the rms, employers experience the following benets: increased
employee morale; engagement and commitment to the organization; reduced turnover; extended hours of
operation; increased ability to recruit outstanding employees; reduced absenteeism and lateness and creation
of an image as an employer with a choice with family-friendly, exible work schedules. An important aspect
to bear in mind also is that exitime and to have a variety of work schedules are clear advantages for the
environment because they reduce congestion and tra¢ c problems.
The main factors that inuence the determination of working hours are: technological conditions; capital
available; existing legislation and institutional framework; the requirements imposed by demand or by output
characteristics and also the preferences of employers and workers. In this paper we focus on the relationship
between technological characteristics and workerspreferences to determine the schedule. We assume that
all rms produce the same output. In this context, exibility is understood as the capacity to match the
preferences of workers will with the rmsneeds.
To illustrate the usefulness of the model, we use it to consider a scenario where the technology used cannot
enforce the preferences of workers and companies, which allows us to graphically illustrate the instantaneous
aggregate output in di¤erent situations compared to the one obtained in a "exible" economy.
A second nding is that the exible result, when rms and workers can assert their preferences, is optimal,
e¢ cient and achieves the maximum instantaneous aggregate production of the economy. The "non exible"
result, never exceeds the aggregate instantaneous production obtained as a result of a "exible" economy.
So the aggregate production during one workday is greater when rms and workers can adjust preferences
about the part of the day that they want to work.
4For example, mothers tend to prefer shorter working hours where public child care services are limited.
5The schedule types were, among others: Daytime-weekday; Daytime-some weekends; Daytime-regular weekends; Some
evenings/nights-but not rotating shifts; Rotating shifts or permanent nights; Fixed own start and nish times; Start and nish
times xed by employer; Varies own start and nish times; Start and nish time varied by employer; Little working time
autonomy; More working time autonomy.
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An outline of the paper follows. First, in Section 2 we explain the assumptions of the model on the
technology and preferences, and we review briey the literature of reference. In Section 3 we describe the
model economy. Section 4 shows the competitive equilibrium. The analysis of exibility is developed in
Section 5. An extension to consider working at home is in Section 6. Section 7 provides a numerical example
and the nal remarks are in 8.
2 Preferences, technology and related literature
The introduction of a exible schedule requires technology with a production function where the capital-
labor ratio can also change throughout the day. It is also necessary to distinguish between working time and
capital utilization time. Therefore, in the model the production is organized in production plants. We dene
a production plant by means of the capital-labor ratio and by the workday of their employees. Our denition
of a production plant is a variation of the plant in Hornstein and Prescott (1993), where both the length
of time in which a plant can be operated and the number of workers operating it can be varied. However,
in Hornstein and Prescott the workers are homogeneous. Fitzgerald (1998) also extends the plant concept
of Hornstein and Prescott in his general equilibrium model of team production. But in each of Fitzgeralds
teams there are only two di¤erent types of workers that must be coordinated. Hansen and Prescott (2005)
construct a real business cycle model where the production takes place at individual plants and the number
of plants operated varies over the cycle. In comparison with the plant concept of those models, we introduce
the time of starting work and consequently the analysis of the timing of work. As with Hansen and Prescott
(2005), the capital is identied with the equipment rather than locations. Furthermore, we assume mobile
and exchangeable equipment between workers and over time. In equilibrium, the capital utilization time and
the percentage of utilization of the installed capital are determined.
Although in this area the workweek is the usual measurement, to discuss the schedule it is better to limit
ourselves to just one day. We dene a workday as a combination of starting time and duration. Therefore,
plant refers to a way of producing, not to something physical. The plants di¤er for the k/n ratio and for the
workday. This introduces the possibility of adaptation in the utilization of the capital and in the workday.
Afterwards, the denition of plant will be expanded including a time throughout the day in which the
production is maximized.
First, there is a predened workday (starting time and duration) and plants and then an analysis is made
as to how workers would provide their work and what workdays are going to be carried out as the adjustment
result. We assume nonlinear mapping from hours of work in a given period to labor services provided in
that same period. This assumption is also a key feature in Prescott, Rogerson and Walleniusmodel (2007),
where at low hours of work this mapping is convex, due to such factors as the costs associated with getting
set up in a job, communicating with coworkers and so on. On the other hand, at long hours of work this
mapping is assumed to be concave due to fatigue, weariness, etc. Therefore, in our model the function that
relates time of work and services of the work initially increases and later, from a certain moment, it falls.
When we observe all the workers, the function looks like gure 1, which shows when people work, created
from the time use survey.
With regard to the preferences, literature on the matter usually considers the disutility of the time of work
as increasing and convex. As we use the instantaneous use of time to be worked, the disutility of the time of
work depends not only on the quantity of worked hours, but also on the moment of the day in which they
occur. Workers prefer to organize their working day around a certain time, so disutility increases as working
hours di¤er from this time. Our analysis focuses on the timing of production activities, so we must also
agree that some activities should be conducted at certain parts of the day. Equally, at other times there are
activities that cannot be done. The work schedule results from the assignment of di¤erent types of workers
to di¤erent plants. Depending on workerspreferences, availability of capital and technology, working times
are scheduled. The use of the instantaneous use of time provides us with relevant information about e¤ort,
behavior of workers and rmsproduction and protability, which allows us to us come up with relevant
results. As noted by Hamermesh (1999, p.37), studying the instantaneous use of time as opposed to time
used integrated over days, weeks, years or a working life, can yield insights into questions about behavior
that are not obtainable from examining other labor market outcomes. The equilibrium exists and is unique.
Secondly, as in the reference model (Hornstein and Prescott, 1993) the formation of plants is allowed to
form part of the set of possibilities of production and not to exist independently of this set (exogenous).
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Our analysis thus also enables us to determine what the optimal plants should be like. In this way we can
determine the best set of possibilities. The result obtained is an e¢ cient assignment and, after comparing
with what we observe in reality, this enables guidelines to be established for the policymakers on how act to
improve the e¢ ciency of the productive system.
As in Hornstein (2002), production can increase with the incorporation of one more shift of work. This
allows us to determine the time of utilization of the capital that does not necessarily have to coincide with
that of work. In this type of model, the capital installed normally is not used to full capacity, that is, the
whole capital during all the time. This is so because there is a marginal increasing cost in the utilization of
the capital, since it increases the depreciation or/and because it implies using workers during more untimely
hours and it is necessary to pay them more. Nevertheless, in our model if the utilization of the capital spreads
using workers who prefer working at these hours, the marginal increasing cost of the capital does not exist
due to the more wages/hour motive. Therefore, if there are people with preferences for being employed at
di¤erent schedules the plant will be operative for more hours and with this the added production and the
utilization of capital of the rm will increase. The model also allows to explain how the rm must organize
the capital among the plants.
As the number of plant types is nite the model lies within the framework of the indivisible labor and
employment lotteries of Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), although to get analytical results this environ-
ment will change towards divisible labor in a similar way to Hornstein and Prescott (1993) and Fitzgerald
(1998).
With regard to the related literature, besides the one already commented previously, in general the timing
of work has received little attention in literature concerning economic analysis. Wooden, Warren and Drago
(2009) analyze the role played by mismatches between hours actually worked and working time preferences
in contributing to reported levels of job and life satisfaction. They show that it is not the number of hours
worked per se that matters but whether these hours are in line with workerspreferences.
Some studies analyze the distribution of the time of work throughout the working life. Prescott, Rogerson
and Wallenius (2007) present a model of lifetime aggregate labor supply where both the fraction of life spent
in employment and the hours of work while employed are characterized as an equilibrium outcome. But
the model does not explain the timing of work. Hence it is necessary to include life cycle e¤ects such as
age-varying productivity or age-varying disutility of work. As usual in the life cycle labor supply literature,
Rogerson and Wallenius (2006) use a function that represents exogenous life cycle variation in individual
productivity. This function is assumed to be single peaked, twice continuously diferentiable and has zero
derivative only at its global maximum. In our model there is considered to be a similar relation between over
time and individual productivity, but during the workday.
The issue of the e¤ects of deregulation in shop opening hours is the theme in some theoretical and
applied papers. Inderst and Irmen (2005) analyze the impact on prices of deregulation in shop opening
hours in a model of imperfect duopolistic competition. Burda and Weil (2005) investigate the real e¤ects of
deregulation in a general equilibrium model. Both papers stress that the results depend on the value placed
on leisure/shopping time for consumers. Note that the paper by Burda and Weil focuses on arguments against
exible schedules such as positive externalities arising from enjoying free and work time collectively.
Among literature dealing with work schedules, Weiss (1996) constructs a lifetime labor supply model to
explain the synchronization of work schedules. An analysis is made as to how workers choose the optimal
work schedule to maximize their lifetime utility subject to the constraints derived from the exogenous time
pattern of the workers productivity. The length of each working day and the beginning of the rst (and
subsequent) work intervals are deduced. But, in Weisspaper there is a partial equilibrium model and the
interaction between capital utilization and work schedules is only mentioned. From an empirical point of view,
Hamermesh (1999) analyzes the timing of work in the United States and shows indicators on the fraction of
workers who work at each hour of the day. He explains the decline in evening and night work by the rise in
real earnings leading workers to move away from such work. Dupaigne (2001) is probably the pioneer who
incorporates the idea that the value of leisure varies throughout the day. He studies the e¤ects of shift work
on workerswelfare, although workers can only choose the starting time, as the length of the work period has
already been established.
Liu, Wen and Zhu (2005) draw up a partial equilibrium model to analyze the synchronization of working
hours between workers of di¤erent skills, but they refer to the synchronization in the number of hours and
not in the schedule. In this model, all the people start working at the same time. Lührmann and Weiss
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(2010) analyze the relation between longer work hours and higher labor force participation with outsourcing
of domestic tasks. As a consequence, the demand for unskilled labor rises and unemployment falls. They
develop a general equilibrium model and nd quantitative relevant e¤ects of these relations from the empirical
evidence. Apart from all these papers, we have not found models that treat the determination of when people
work from a theoretical perspective, including microeconomic fundamentals and equilibrium conditions.
Figure 1: Proportion of employees working at the beginning of each hour









Source: United Kingdom and Germany: Comparable Time Use Statistics, 2005, Eurostat
Spain: Time Use Survey, 2009-2010 (the proportion is over all population, but UK and in Germany is over population aged 20 to 74).
3 The economy
The main features of our model economy with exible schedules are: the existence of di¤erent types of plants
and the possibility for workers to choose between di¤erent workdays. Also, unlike models with homogeneous
agents, in equilibrium not all work at the same time.
Although it is a question of time, the analysis refers to one period. The model ignores inter-temporal
considerations. We are assuming that the issues about the work schedule will be the same henceforth. So,
this economy lasts for one period (a day) and the length of the day is normalized to unity.
The economy is populated by a continuum of people with measure 1. There is a nite number of di¤erent
agent types, i 2 I = f1; 2; ::::NIg. The measure of agent type i is i and
P
i 
i = 1: People types are
distinguished by their di¤erent preferences regarding leisure or preferences as regards no market working
time (necessary to reconcile working and personal life, for example), especially with regard to when they
prefer to enjoy leisure time. Each type can be characterized by a moment  i 2 f ; :::; +g  [0; 1] that is
the preferred moment to work in a day for this individual type or when leisure is less valued. So, individuals i
prefer their work schedule to be organized around that moment. We dene 0 =  ; and  i =  i 1+ ; where
 is a constant satisfying:  = (
+  )
NI
: In this manner, the distribution of types is going to determine the
distribution of working times in equilibrium. Individuals are identical in their endowment: a time endowment
of 1 can be allocated to either work or leisure, and k > 0 units of capital. Individuals are also identical in
their preferences about consumption goods.
The distribution of types may capture the idea that consumers value the synchronization of leisure time
with other types positively. In this case the respective  i would be very close. Burda and Weil (2005) stress
that positive externalities can arise from resting or enjoying free time collectively6 . On the contrary, the
di¤erent types of agents may be very di¤erent in their preferences,  i , probably as a consequence of di¤erent
needs of making work compatible with family or studies, for example.
Given that our interest focuses on the work schedule, it is necessary to distinguish between duration of
work and timing of work. So, we dene the working time during a day:
6They also consider that negative externalities may result from coordinated leisure or synchronized economic activity. With
these considerations Burda and Weil draw up a model to analyze blue laws with two types of households: manufacturing families
and retail families.
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DEFINITION. A workday s is a pair (t; h) where t is the moment at which work starts and h is the
length.
Assuming that individuals prefer to organize their working time around a moment of the day, we adopt
the function introduced by Dupaigne (2001) that sums up the instantaneous value of leisure between the
time of starting and nishing7 . So, in our model the preferences of each individual type are represented by
a function vi(s) that sums up the instantaneous value of leisure between t and t + h, which is measured by





and where the integrand sign obeys this, during the period when time passes continuously. The function
#i() is strictly convex, decreasing for  <  i and increasing for  >  i; so #
i0( i) = 0: For a given number
of hours the disutility increases as the central moment deviates from the preferred time of day.
With respect to production technology, output is produced by a large but nite number of types of
production plants to which workers are assigned, and they use capital during one type of workday. So, a
production plant is characterized by the ratio of capital per worker k and by the workday s. The same stock
of capital can be utilized in di¤erent plants if the respective workdays do not overlap. That is, the capital is
equipment that is mobile between workers. If the working time is organized in shift systems, the operating
time of capital utilized is longer than a corresponding workday.
Concerning the output of a plant, we distinguish between the instantaneous production and the total
production. The output per instant in a plant with n workers and with a ratio of capital per worker k;
assuming, as usual, constant returns to scale in the instantaneous production, is: f(k)n; with f 0 > 0; f 00 < 0,
but the resulting output depends on the workday the plant operates. Both the length and the time of starting
matter because we could consider, for example, that the productivity in an 8-hour workday is not the same
during the day as it is at night. So, the output per worker in a type (k; s) plant is: f(k) g(s); where g(s)
measures the e¤ective working time of a workday starting at t and ending at t + h. If the set of feasible
workdays is denoted by S, then g : S ! R; multiplies the instantaneous output of the plant that operates
the workday (t; h). The function g(s) sums up the value of an instantaneous index of productivity between





This denition of e¤ective working time allows for the consideration of several hypotheses. So, according
to Mulligan (2001) the instantaneous productivity function could incorporate the fatigue caused by extended
intervals of work. Booth and Ravallion (1993) consider that the number of e¢ ciency hours obtained from a
given number of clock hours is a strictly concave function of hours worked because there is a warm-up period
followed by a fatigue period. Corrado and Mattey (1997) use the domain of the production function for the
denition of di¤erent technologies: continuous production, two discontinuous shifts, etc. All these questions
can be included by means of di¤erent specications of (): We assume that () is strictly concave with
a maximum at about b 2 [0; 1]: Productivity is maximized at this time, and for a given number of hours,
output is lower the greater the distance from this point. Although workers and jobs are heterogeneous, output
is e¤ectively homogeneous. Thus in Walrasian equilibrium only some types of plants will be operated.
We represent this economy in a McKenzie-type general equilibrium language. Let a commodity point
x be an element of the Euclidean space L: The consumption set Xi of a type i agent is a subset of the
commodity space L. Preferences over consumption bundles in Xi are represented by the utility function
7 In Dupaigne (2001) the number of hours is given and workers choose the time to start to work. In addition, workers are
homogeneous.
8Di¤erent types of preferences aboutleisure can be considered depending on the functional form of (). If the workers care
only about the number of hours spent at work and the work schedule does not matter, () = constant, which is the case in
Weiss (1996). In literature the most usual form of dening preferences about leisure is assuming that the value of leisure is
increasing and convex throughout the day, Fitzgerald (1998), Hornstein and Prescott (1993). In the cited papers, the relevant
variable is the length of the leisure time and not its distribution.
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U i : Xi ! R. Production is described by an aggregate production possibility set Y , which is a convex cone





The model is in continuous time. However, it is simplied by assuming that there is a nite number of feasible
workdays, S = fs1; s2; :::sNsg which is a subset of a bigger set of workdays, T H: That is, the set of possible
workday lengths denoted by H, where H  [0; 1], H = fh0; h1; :::::hNHg and the set T = ft0; t1; :::::tNT g; T 
[0; 1[, that contains the possible starting times. Thus, by limiting the number of elements of the set S, we
consider only the standard workdays9 . As we will see later, we consider exible working hours if the elements
of S are determined jointly by rm and workers.
Introducing a nite number of di¤erent workdays creates an indivisibility, that is, the nonconvexity of
the set of consumption and production possibilities. The introduction of employment lotteries, following
Rogerson (1988), is a useful device to convexify these sets. So, we assume that people supply a lottery
contract that species the probability of working di¤erent workdays, and they will work only one workday
depending on the lotterys outcome.
The commodity space L is R2M(S), whereM(S) denotes the set of signed measures on the Borel sigma
algebra of S. An element of L is given by (c; k; n), where c is the consumption good, k denotes the services of
the capital stock, and n is a measure over labor workdays. One unit of capital produces one unit of capital
services. When S is a nite set, n is a vector and n(s) is the measure of type s workday (with start at t and
length h). The agent i that chooses a point in L receives ci units of the consumption good in exchange for
providing ki units of capital10 and some measure ni over labor workdays.
3.2 Production possibility set
A production plant is characterized by the capital per worker ratio k and by the workday s. Let K and S
be nite sets and let J  KxS be the set of feasible plants with generic element (k; s) and cardinality NJ .
We can index plant types by j : 1; 2; :::::; NJ : The output per worker of a type (k; s) plant is: f(k) g(s);
where g(s) measures the e¤ective working time of a workday starting at t and ending at t+ h. A production
plan organizes the distribution of inputs across plants of di¤erent types, given that workers are available for
certain workdays, while capital is available at the beginning of the period, and each time a shift nishes the
capital utilized is available for another shift. In this way, the production plan determines the total time of
utilization of capital, the distribution of di¤erent ratios throughout the day and the distribution of workers.
Let mj denotes the measure of type j plant operated, and also the measure of workers in it. Then the
production plan is a vector of NJ numbers, fm1;m2; :::::;mNJg;m 2 RNJ+ ; mj  0; which describes how the
inputs are allocated across plants of di¤erent types. The production possibility set, Y , is dened as:





fj: tj  t < tj+hjg
mj kj  K; for each t 2 T (3)
X
fj: hj=h; tj=tg
mj  N(s); for each s 2 S g
The rst constraint highlights that the total amount of the consumption good is less than or equal to the
total output produced by all plant types. The second constraint states: for each feasible starting time the
capital allocated across all the plant types with this starting time, or with the previous starting time but not
yet nished is less than or equal to the total capital available. The third constraint states that the amount of
9Afterwards, it will be necessary to consider that the set S is S = T H; and T = [0; 1[ and H = [0; 1]. Also it would be
possible to consider the existence of working time regulation by means of imposing constraints on the sets T and H:
10The component k of the commodity space is not the same as the element k of a plant because the latter is an element of a
nite set. Thus they are denoted di¤erently.
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type s workdays allocated across all plant types is less than or equal to the total amount of type s workdays
available. It is immediate that Y is a convex cone.
3.3 Preferences
Turning to individualspreference ordering and their feasible consumption bundles: the utility of a type i 2 I
person choosing the commodity point x = (c; k; n) is given by:




where vi : S  ! R+ represents the accumulated disutility of working the workday s, and where u : R  !
R; v(0; 0) = 0; and limc!0 u;(c) = 1. The function u(c) is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable and
strictly concave. Notice that
P
s n
i(s)vi(s) is the expected disutility of working for a type i person. The
consumption possibility set of an agent type i is:
Xi( k ) =
(
(c; k; n) : k  k; c  0; k  0;
X
s2S
ni(s) = 1; ni(s)  0
)
(5)
which contains the standard nonnegativity constraints and the conditions that capital services are restricted
by the capital stock endowment, and n is a probability measure.
The economy is completely described by E = f(U i; Xi; i)i2I ; Y g
4 Competitive equilibrium
The commodities traded are given by x = (c; k; n). Prices are in terms of the consumption good. The rental
price of capital is r. The wage is a function w mapping signed measures into R. With a nite set of possible
workdays, w is a vector of prices, where w(s) is the price of the type s workday. That is, if a person works
the workday s with probability 1, w(s) units of the consumption good are received.
The rm rents capital, employs workers for workdays of di¤erent types and decides how to allocate
these resources across all the plants. On hiring workers, the rm buys lottery contracts that specify the
probability of a person working workdays of di¤erent types, possibly including a workday of length 0. All
the individuals of the same type will sell the same lottery contract, but people of di¤erent types will choose
di¤erent probabilities. In fact, each workday will be worked by a measure of agents similar to the sum of the
probability specied by the contract of working that workday of each type multiplied by the measure of that
type.
Given prices (r; w), the rm chooses quantities (C;K; N) to solve:




s:t: : (C;K; N) 2 Y (7)
where N(s) is the measure of workdays of type s.
In this economy, individuals purchase the consumption good and sell capital and labor services to rms.
The labor services are supplied in the shape of a lottery contract that species the probability of working
di¤erent workdays. The amount an individual receives for a given lottery contract does not depend on the
lotterys outcome, that is, on the type of workday the individual works ex post, but the probabilities of work





s:t: : (c; k; n) 2 Xi(k) (9)





Denition of equilibrium. A competitive equilibrium for this economy is an allocation [(xi)i2I ; y]
and a price system (r; w) such that
i) xi maximizes U i(x) subject to xi 2 Xi(k) and the budget constraint (10), i 2 I.





Given that the set of feasible workdays is nite, the commodity space is nite dimensional and according to
Stokey and Lucas (1989) the rst and second welfare theorems hold. Therefore we can study the properties of
the anonymous Pareto optima of this economy to establish properties of competitive equilibrium allocations.
In this economy, with heterogeneous agents, individuals of the same type choose the same commodity point,
although this does not imply that all of them work the same workday, since the chosen commodity point will
involve randomizing over di¤erent workdays.









As there is a nite number NJ of (k;s) pairs, the measure of workers in each type of plant nj is the sum
of di¤erent types of workers who supply work on the workday of this plant, and it is also the measure mj of


















j: tj t <tj+hj




inij all j 2 J (14)X
j
nij  1 all i 2 I (15)
That is, the planner assigns workers of di¤erent types to plants with di¤erent workdays.
We divide the Pareto problem into two subproblems: one that is a linear program and one that is a
nonlinear problem. Let the function V : RNJxNI ! R be dened as:








This function gives the disutility of work associated with the working plan n. Notice that V (n) is linear
in n.
Let us suppose:
Assumption 1: the slope of the contours of the function V (n) does not equal the slope of any of the




Then we establish the following:
PROPOSITION 1. The solution of maximizing (11) subject to (12)-(15) is unique and the number
of pairs (k; s) receiving strictly positive mass is less than or equal to NI +NT + 1:
Proof 11 . Given the division of the Pareto problem, and by substituting the constraint (14) in (12) and
11The reasoning followed in this proof is similar to that provided in Fitzgerald (1998).
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(13) with equallity, it is possible to consider:
W (C) = max
n  0
V (n) (11.a)











inij  k all t 2 T (13.a)X
j
nij  1 all i 2 I (14.a)
where C =
P
ici: Let Cmax be the solution to maxn0 C subject to (12.a)-(14.a). W (C) is the smallest sum
of the disutilities of working associated with producing C units of output, and Cmax is the maximum feasible
value of C which can be produced. For 0  C  Cmax there is a solution which has at most a number of











where it is straightforward that the solution is Cmax given the continuity and strict concavity of u(c) and
the concavity of W . Associated with this unique value of C is the unique n that solves (11.a)-(14.a), which
has at most NT +NI + 1 nonzero elements.
Proposition 1 states that the Pareto optimal allocation will assign positive values to most NT +NI + 1
di¤erent nij : This nite-linear program is solved by the simplex algorithm which searches for optimal basic
solutions. The column vector associated to each nij is [ f(kj)g(sj)
i; kj
i; :::; 1]0:, The set of column vectors
dened by the basic solutions must be linearly independent. Thus plants that do work can employ more than
one type of worker. A basic solution is degenerated if the number of points with strictly positive mass is
less than the number of constraints. The number of di¤erent plants that will start to run, the measure and
the type of workers allocated to them depend on the coe¢ cients both in the objective function and in the
constraints, and on the parameter values in the constraints. That is to say, it is a question of kj ; f(kj); g(sj);
vi(sj); and k: We can see this through the dual constraints or rst-order conditions with respect to nij of the
linear program:
f(kj)g(sj)





)i   vi(sj)i   i  0 8 nij (18)
where 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (12); each p is the multiplier on the
constraint of the capital corresponding to the starting time tp; that is, the constraints denoted (13). So,
the condition (18) corresponding to a type j plant, with starting time tj and ending time tz = tj + hj ;
includes the multipliers associated with the starting times from tj to tz 1, given that, at the moment tz
the capital allocated to this plant can be used for another plant. The multiplier i is associated with the
labor supply constraint of the individual type i. That is, i is zero if type i workers are not all working in
equilibrium. Equation (18) must hold with equality if nij is strictly positive, that is, the output minus the






) and W i(sj) = vi(sj) + i=
i, so the plants and types that work fulll the condition:
F (kj ; sj) Rj  W i(sj) = 0 (19)
12From the individual maximization problem, equations (8), (9) and (10), it is deduced the reserve wage for type i works the
workday sj ; and from the rms problem (6)-(7) the condition of 0 prot for the plants that are going to operate is obtained.
Substituting the reserve wage in this condition gives the condition in (18).
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Therefore, the types of workers who are employed obtain a wage wi(sj) greater or at least equal to the
reservation wages, that is vi(sj)+i=
i: (if there is unemployment in this type of workers then the reservation
wage is only: vi(sj) as  equal to zero). Among the employed people, the value of employment less than or
equal to one depends on the available amount of capital in relation to the capital of the plant.
The term F (kj ; sj) W i(sj) is the net output of the plant.
5 Analysis of exibility in working schedules
5.1 The economy without a exible workday
An economy without a exible workday is characterized by a set of production plants J , which is nite, and
with working schedules determined previously by the rm. As the set J contains more elements and more
variety of workdays, it easier for workers to nd a plant with a workday that suits their preferences.
In equilibrium, worker types will be assigned to plants if they full condition (19).
For illustrative purposes only, in Figure 2 we plot the instantaneous production function: f(k)(); and
the function #() for three worker types13 (type 1 with the red function, type 2 with the blue one). The
set J is formed by one plant: (k; s0); where s0 = (t0;h0): The output per worker is the area under f(k)()
and between the two dashed lines. The disutility of each worker is the area under his/her respective function
#() and the two dashed lines. In equilibrium, type 2 workers will be assigned to the plant (k; s0); because
of the cumulative desutility:
R t0+h0
t0
#i()d ; and therefore the reservation wage is lower for this type. If
there is enough capital, then type 1 workers could be employed too (because the value of  would equal the
reservation wages). But type 3 would hardly work in this plant.
Figure 2
a) Instantaneous production function, three types of instantaneous disutility of work and the only workday




to --------ho--------- tto  - - - - - - - - - - -ho- - - - - - - - - - - - -
net output
As the set J contains more elements, the workdays would be more appropriate and more people would
work.
Figure 2 could represent the case of a standard workday and three worker types that prefer to work at
nights, another during mornings and another during evenings.
We analyze the properties of the solutions of the problem when the set J is nite and contains some
standard workdays. This is shown in the Appendix.
13The functions utilized in all the graphics have the form:
#i() = a+ b cos(c   d)
() = p+ q sin(r   z)
and parameters a; b; c; d; p; q; r; z will be chosen to ilustrate the main issues.
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5.2 The economy with a exible workday
If we choose progressively ner grids on J the solutions converge toward the solution when the set J is a
rectangular subset on R3. In this way it is possible to determine which elements set J should contain to
maximize production and employment.
We examine more closely the determination of work schedules that results from the interaction between
individualspreferences and plantstechnology. Hence, it is necessary to specify the preferences about working
time for each worker type and the shape of the function g(s). It is also necessary to consider that the set of
feasible workday S is no longer a nite set, but it is the convex set14 :bS = f(t; h) j t 2 [0; 1]; h 2 [0; 1]; t+ h  1; and h = 0) t = 0g
Now set K is R+. Therefore, the set bJ; the set of all feasible production plants, is: R+ x bS.
From the necessary conditions given in (18) any plant that is operated in equilibrium and the type of
worker in it must maximize the left hand side of (18) with respect to k; t; and h.
For a given k, the optimal working hours that each type i should perform will be obtained from15 :
max
(t;h)2bS f(k)g(s)  vi(s) (20)
From the rst order conditions and the denitions of the functions v and g; equations (1) and (2), the optimal
moment to start, t; and the optimal moment to nish, t+h; for a worker i in a plant with k are respectively:
f(k)(t) = #i(t) (21)
f(k)(t+ h) = #i(t+ h) (22)
that is, the optimal moment to start is the instant at which the marginal utility of leisure coincides with
the marginal productivity at that instant, and the same concerning the optimal moment to nish. The
strict concavity of () and the strict convexity of #i() ensure the fulllment of the su¢ cient conditions,
f(k)0(t) > #i
0
(t) and f(k)0(t+ h) < #i
0
(t+ h); provided that t <  i < t+ h.
Thus, the components of the workday, for the types that meet the rst and second order conditions, can
be denoted as t(k;  i) and h(k;  i). Now, g(s(t; h)) is dened as g(k;  i).
It is easy to see that @t@k < 0 and
@h
@k > 0; greater capital per worker ratio implies that the optimal workday
starts earlier and nishes later.
PROPOSITION 2: If the economy provides a exible workday, the net output of each plant is
maximized with the workday resulting from the interaction between workers preferences and technology.
Proof: as demonstrated in the problem (20).
We obtain f(k; s1); (k; s2); :::(k; sNI )g; that is a candidate to form the set J , and where each element
contains the same ratio k and a workday depending on the preferences of each type. Comparing between
types for a given k; types with greater f(k)g(s)   vi(s) will have greater k to bring the prot to 0, in
condition (18), so as the  i ! b the corresponding  is greater.
While with the inexible workday work only one type, now from the conditions (21) and (22) could be
an optimal workday for everyone and capital will be used for longer.
Then we analyze what the optimal capital-labor ratio is for each plant given the time in which the capital
will be operational. It is important to distinguish whether the workdays of di¤erent plants overlap or not
because this determines both the shape and the number of constraints on capital allocation in the original
problem. That is, they have implications for the assignment of the capital between plants.
A) The distribution of types determines that the workdays do not overlap
14 In this case the commodity space is innite dimensional, but the number of constraints remains nite. This is a semi-innite
linear program where an optimal measure assigns positive mass to no more points than there are constraints (Hornstein and
Prescott, 1989).
15Given that %0 is the same for all plants and dividing the left hand side of (18) by i, the term to maximize is simplied in
this way.
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Assuming that the preferences are so di¤erent that when one type works then the other types do not,
now the left hand side of condition in (18) that we denote as (k) is:
(k) = f(k)g(k;  i)o   k  vi(k;  i)  i=i (23)
The ratio k which is assigned to the plants that operate in equilibrium is such that it maximizes (k):
The rst order condition is:
f 0(k)g(k;  i)o    = 0 (24)
given that from (21) we get: f(k)(t) @t@k #(t)
@t





The k ratio satisfying the condition is ki ; such that the marginal productivity in this plant is equal to
the value imputed to the utilization of capital during this time, divided by 0:
And the second order condition:





states that for this ratio the decreasing e¤ect on the marginal productivity is greater than the increasing
e¤ect on the e¤ective working time.
We state the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3. If the technology and the worker preferences determine that the workdays do
not overlap, the set of pairs (k; s) receiving strictly positive mass consists of plants whose respective ratios of
capital per worker, ki ; are such that k

i > k; and the employment within each type depends on 
i; k; and ki :
Proof. If the workdays do not overlap, the amount of capital utilized in each plant must satisfy only one
constraint (13.a) and only for one worker type. That is: kini  k:
Associated with this constraint there is one multiplier, , corresponding to the utilization of the capital
from the moment t. The condition in (24) must be satised for ki such that k

i 
ini = k; because if the
constraint (13.a) does not satisfy equity,  would be 0 (by the complementary slackness condition), and for
k > 0; it is not possible that f 0(k)g(k;  i) = 0: Therefore, given that 
i < 1 and ni  1; necessarily ki > k:
The distribution of the workers by types (i < 1 ) and which are heterogeneous enough (workdays do not
overlap) lead to fully capital utilization and full employment is possible for the types who work.
PROPOSITION 4. Comparing between worker types, the ratio ki depends on the distance jb    ij
as follows:
Shorter jb    ij leads to a lower or equal ratio ki : The ratio could be higher only when the decrease in
the marginal productivity is compensated with the increase in the e¤ective time as the type of worker is more
appropriate.
Proof. The value of g(k;  i) increases when  i ! b : With a continuum of types the maximum g with
respect to  i and () implies that 0() = i
0
() = 0 which is reached when b =  i: From (23) and (24)
as  i approaches b both g(k;  i) and  increase. Thus, lower or equal k implies higher or equal f 0(k) and
the condition (24) is met. Only when comparing between types, for example type 1 and 2, when jb   1j <
jb   2j and g(k; 1) > g(k; 2); and the corresponding  is also higher for type 1 than for type 2, it is certain
that with k1 > k

2 :
f 0(k1)g(k1; 1) > f
0(k2)g(k2; 2) (26)
more appropriate types would use a higher ratio:
Figure 3 shows the two cases: in a) the most remote types handle a lower ratio, and in the case b) the
contrary . The instantaneous production appears (in bold) multiplied by f(k) corresponding to every type
of workday. Remember that the distribution of capital also a¤ects the length of the workday, so types of
workers who manage more capital work more hours. To meet with the capital constraint, the planner assigns
the employment such that ni = k
iki
: Thus, unemployment (which implies ni < 1), could exist in such type
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of workers. In case a) types with lower measure and whose moment  is more distant with respect to b work
in plants whose capital ratio is lower, so the employment within this type of workers will be greater. In case
b) the employment could be greater within types closer to b :






a) k decreases with jb    ij b) k increases with jb    ij
B) The distribution of types means that the workdays do overlap
Let us assume that after solving the conditions in (20) and (21) and the respective second order conditions,
the optimal workdays of some types are overlapped. If set J contains plants whose workdays are overlapped
and these plants work in equilibrium, the capital-labor ratio must satisfy the constraint (13.a) for each
starting time. Assuming workdays of types i = 1; 2; 3; and so on, are overlapped such that: ::::t1 < t2 <
(t1 + h1) < t3 < (t2 + h2) < (t3 + h3)::::now the conditions in (18) are for each type:
F (k1; 1)  k1(1 + 2) W 1(k1; 1) = 0
F (k2; 2)  k2(2 + 3) W 2(k2; 2) = 0 (27)
F (k3; 3)  k3(3 + 4) W 3(3; k3) = 0
Therefore, if the capital stock is utilized by di¤erent types of workers simultaneously this is because the
unit prot derived simultaneously using the capital must be the same:
F (k1; 1) W 1(k1; 1)
k1
 1 =
F (k2; 2) W 2(k2; 2)
k2
 3;
F (k2; 2) W 2(k2; 2)
k2
 2 =




PROPOSITION 5. If the technology and the worker preferences determine that the workdays do
overlap, the set of pairs (k; s) receiving strictly positive mass consists of plants whose respective ratios of
capital per worker, ki ; are such that k

i Q k and depend negatively on the distance jb    ij :
Proof. The ratio k that maximizes  in plants with overlapped workdays must satisfy the rst order
condition: :
f 0(k1)g(1; k1) 0 = 1 + 2 (29)
f 0(k2)g(2; k2) 0 = 2 + 3
:::::
(for plants overlapping two by two). The capital is assigned between di¤erent plants so that:
f 0(k1)g(1; k1) 0 1 = f 0(k2)g(2; k2) 0 3; f 0(k3)g(3; k3) 0 4 = f 0(k4)g(4; k4) 0 5:::::::: (30)
15
If two types work simultaneously during part of their workday, the type with lesser distance jb    ij
reaches greater g( i; ki) and utilizes larger k, which implies lower f 0: So, both types will have the same
imputed value.
As regards to the total available capital, fulllment with constraint (13.a) leads to ki Q k because what
counts is the sum of the products of capital and employment of each plant.
In Figure 4 we plot two types of workers and the instantaneous production function as in Figure 2. The
workdays (t1; h1) and (t2; h2) are the optimal ones for each type of workers. The instantaneous production
of type 2 is larger than type 1 because they utilize di¤erent capital-labor ratios.





Nevertheless, could also occur that only one plant meets the condition (27) and it is the only operating.
As we see, the proposed model is a framework in which to analyze variables we consider relevant to
determine the exibility of working hours. After analyzing possible ndings the exibility of the working
time leads to the net output being maximized through the day. In Figure 5 we plot the instantaneous net
output corresponding to the plants of Figure 4, that is the continuous line measuring the output of the rst
plant starting at t1, followed by the sum of two plants when overlap at t2 and when the plant 1 has stopped
at t1 + h1; the output of the second plant . In order to compare with the case of Figure 2 this is showed
with a dashed line starting at t0.




6 An extension: paid work at home versus work at the o¢ ce
Now lets assume that it is possible to be working both at the home and at the plant of the rm. For example,
certain sectors of activity that are characterized by being intensive in work and in which the requirements of
the installed capital are limited.
Nevertheless, we suppose that in the plant or o¢ ce the employees must share the existing capital, whereas
at home the neecessary capital is minimal and often owned by the worker. Obviously, the exibility is easier
to be applied in productive activities by fewer needs of xed capital.
In order to distinguish between working at home and working at the plant we consider two sets of
feasible workdays: S1 = fs11; s12; :::::s1Ng that contains workdays to be worked in the plant and S2 =
fs21; s22; :::::s2Ng, with workdays at home. Now the working time in the plant is limited by legal or technical
reasons such that the starting time is xed at t; and workers can choose the number of hours to work in the
plant (by assigning a measure to di¤erent lenghts). Therefore the elements of the set S1 are s1j = (t; h1j):
The set S2 contains several workdays to be worked at home. As equilibrium result, a worker may work only
at the plant, or only at home, or partly at the plant and partly at home.
The commodity space L is R2 M(S1)M(S2). An element of L is given by (c; k; n1; n2), where n1 is
a measure over workdays at the plant and n2 is a measure over workdays at home.
With respect to the production possibility set this contains the production in plants plus the production
at home. Let J1  K  S1 be the set of feasible plants with generic element (k; s1) and cardinality NJ1 .
The output per worker of a type (k; s1) plant is: f(k) g(s1). Also the set of feasible production at home is
J2  fkg  S2 with generic element (k; s2) and cardinality NJ2 : We normalize f(k) = 1 and the output per
worker of a type (k; s2) plant is: g0(s2): Now the function g0(s) sums up the value of an instantaneous index
of productivity of working at home which is denoted by the function 0(); di¤erent from the productivity at
the plant, ():Then the production plan is a pair of measures m1 and m2; which describes how the inputs
are allocated across plants of di¤erent types. The production possibility set, Y , is dened as:
Y  ffC;K; N1; N2g : there exists a production plan m1 2 R
NJ1













m1j kj  K; (31)X
fj: hj=h; tj=tg
m1j  N(s1); for each s 2 S1
X
fj: hj=h; tj=tg
m2j  N(s2); for each s 2 S2 g
The possibility to work at home a¤ects the individualspreference ordering and their feasible consumption
bundles. So the utility of a type i 2 I person choosing the commodity point x = (c; k; n1; n2) is given by:









And the consumption possibility set of an agent type i is:
Xi( k ) =
(
(c; k; n) : k  k; c  0; k  0;
X
s2S1[S2
ni(s) = 1; ni(s)  0
)
(33)
The denition of equilibrium is the same as in Section 4 and following the same steps we deduce the
rst-order conditions with respect to ni1j and n
i
2j ; that are:
f(kj) g(s1j)
i 0   kjki   vi(s1j)i   i  0 8 ni1j (34)
g0(s2j)
i 0   vi(s2j)i   i  0 8 ni2j (35)
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where 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the output constraint. k is the multiplier on the
constraint of the capital, that is the same for all the plant types s1 because all of them start at time t: The
multiplier i is associated with the labor supply constraint of the individual type i, and he can supply work
both at the plant or at home.
Following some empirical contributions, Gariety and Sha¤er (2007), Eldridge and Pabilonia (2010), work-
ing at home is associated with signicant wage di¤erentials, positive overall, for both men and women. A
positive productivity e¤ect may stem from either the selective granting of working at home to more produc-
tive employees or a productivity-enhancing factor intrinsic to working at home, such as less time spent in
unproductive activities or less fatigue associated with commuting. We adopt this hypothesis and consider
that working at home does not need warming period, or fatigue as it accumulates at the plant, so the function
0() that measures the instant productivity at home is constant. The question is at what level compared
with the plant. Figure 6 shows several cases where the productivity at home (continuous line) is higher than





In equilibrium any plant that operates and/or anyone working at home must maximize the left hand side
of (34) and (35) with respect to k; h1; t2; and h2.
For a given k, the optimal working hours (t is given) that each type i should perform at the plant will
satisfy :
f(k)(t + h1) = #




0(t2 + h2) = #
i(t2 + h2) (37)
and the second order conditions, too. The results depend on the preferences of worker types and the
productivity index.
Therefore, the possibility of being employed at home allows to compensate the reduction of the produc-
tivity generated by the more or less xed schedules imposed by the plant or the o¢ ce.
7 Numerical example
Through an easy example we can show the results that the model predicts and the relevance of some key
parameters. Assuming three types of workers, whose preferences as regards working time are given by the
function: #() = a+b cos(c d); the parameters c and d dene the value of  i of each type. So, the functions
are: #1() = 1:5 + 1:5 cos(3 + 1); #2() = 1:5 + 1:5 cos(3   1:5); and #3() = 1:5 + 1:5 cos(3 + 2:25),
and the respectives  i are: 1 = 0:23; 2 = 0:5; and 3 = 0:77: That is, translating into 24h., the time of day
that type 1 prefers working is 5:31, type 2: 12:00, and type 3: 18:28. With respect to the production plant,
we assume the plant can operate throughout the day. This could be the case of continuous production. But
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instantaneous production reaches the highest value at b = 0:5: The function () can be described by the
sine wave, specically: () = sin():The function f(k) is k, where  = 0:5: Therefore, the instantaneous
production per worker is f(k)() = k sin(): In Figure 7 we plot the functions #i(), and the function:
k sin() for k = 1 (the solid line), and for k = 2:25 (the dashed line):
Figure 7






From the conditions (21) and (22), given k = 1, this gives: s1 = (0:14; 0:2); s2 = (0:36; 0:25); s3 =
(0:63; 0:21); which means the workday for type 1 is from 3:21 to 8:09, for type 2: from 8:38 to 14:38, and for
type 3, from: 15:07 to 20:09.
For k = 1; i = 1=3; the planner assigns ki = 1; and ni = 1: Total output is C = 0:53: Assuming
0 = 1;  = 0:01; the respectives wages would be: w
1 = 0:13; w2 = 0:232; w3 = 0:138:
Given k = 2:25; we get s1 = (0:12; 0:26); s2 = (0:33; 0:31); s3 = (0:59; 0:27): The workdays are partially
overlapped. In this case, for k = 1; i = 1=3; the planner assigns ki = 2:25;and n1 = 0:18; n2 = 0:21 and
n3 = 0:18; and output is C = 0:2: It is obvious that if there is more available capital employment would be
higher. For example with k = 3 the result is n1 = 0:2; n2 = 1 and n3 = 0:003; and output is C = 0:5:
8 Final Remarks
In this paper, we have addressed the analysis of exible schedules. In this context, exibility is understood as
the capacity to match the rmsneeds well but also the preferences of workers. Therefore, the starting point is
heterogeneity both among rms and among workers. We develop a tractable general equilibrium model that
delivers the work schedules as an equilibrium outcome between the rms decision and workerspreferences.
We propose to analyze heterogeneous workers in relation to their leisure preferences and rms that organize
their production in plants or jobs with di¤erent working hours. Technological advances and changes in the
organization of family and personal life are the encouragement, but not the only one, to promote new forms
of arranging working time. Looking deeper into the theoretical foundations of the organization of working
time can help achieve more rational and e¢ cient results.
In our model, the work schedule results from the assignment of di¤erent types of workers to di¤erent
plants. Depending on workerspreferences, availability of capital and technology, working times are scheduled.
Equilibrium exists and it is unique. The result obtained is an e¢ cient assignment and, after comparing with
what we observe in reality, it enables guidelines to be established for the policy makers on how to act to
improve the e¢ ciency of the productive system.
It is deduced that if all the plants operate with the same technology, the distribution of worker types
together with the amount of capital available determines the types of plants that operate in equilibrium.
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Variations in productivity and the assessment of leisure throughout the day are key factors, and incorpo-
rating others variables we build the analysis of working hours. We have presented some innovations in this
context. That is, the characterization of worker types which are di¤erent in terms of their time preferences,
and also the denition of a workday, including the time to start work. Hence, the utility function and the
production function dened on the workday.
We have presented a model broad enough to address some other related issues, such as working from
home. The impact of labor policies: working time regulations, overtime taxation, policies for balancing work
and family life, remain for future research. We have made restrictive, simplifying assumptions that should
be reconsidered in the future.
APPENDIX
A. Characteristics of the solutions when set J is nite
From the complementary-slackness relationship between primal and dual problems in linear programming,








i is the supply reservation wage of the workday j for the worker i (vi(sj) measures the disutility
of workday j and i is positive when the type i o¤ered work any workday other than zero). The output of
the plant j; f(kj)g(sj) is weighted by the imputed value of every plant in the total output, 0 (which is the
same for all plants).
Operating plants meet the condition:
F (kj ; sj) Rj   wi(sj) = 0
a) Two types of workers in the same plant require that at least, within one type, there is no unemployment.
Two types of workers, a and b; in the same plant j imply the same wage, that is:
va(sj) + a=
a = vb(sj) + b=
b
and given that necessarily vi(sj) 6= vii(sj); ::::the worker with lower disutility compensates with greater
=:
b) One type in two di¤erent plants c;and d implies that:
F (kc; sc) Rc   wi(sc) = F (kd; sd) Rd   wi(sd)
c) Two types of plants, c and d, with di¤erent workers and whose workdays are partially overlapped:
f(kc)g(sc) 0   kc(c + d)  wi(sc) = 0
f(kd)g(sd) 0   kd(d + e)  wii(sd) = 0
that is, if the capital is fully utilized c > 0; d > 0; and in the range where they overlap the prot per
unit of capital must be equal for both.
f(kc)g(sc) 0   kcc   wi(sc)
kc
=
f(kd)g(sd) 0   kde   wii(sd)
kd
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